1 This essay was delivered in the Seminar on Law and Political Theory held by Professors Yishai Blank, Shai Lavi, and Roy Kreitner at Tel Aviv University on December 13, 2006 . The seminar participants had been asked to read excerpts from the book, Language of the Gun (University of Chicago Press 2006); however, it became clear that the focus of interest was on poststructuralism and its relationship to modernity, which is what gave birth to this essay. The essay draws heavily on the social theory discussion in Part II of Language of the Gun. Special thanks to Professors Blank, Lavi, and Kreitner for comments, discussion, disagreement, and a spectacular seminar. modernity. 2 I use the term "penultimate" carefully, though, because, I would argue, in contrast to Judith Butler, who locates poststructuralism in the work of Jacques Derrida principally (see Butler 1990 :158 n.6), that poststructuralism traces to the work of Michel Foucault and precedes deconstruction-which should more accurately be viewed as the final stage of modernity.
In her book Gender Trouble, Judith Butler defines poststructuralism in a similar fashion, despite locating it in Derrida's writings. Butler identifies poststructuralism as the rejection of "the claims of totality and universality and the presumption of binary structural oppositions that implicitly operate to quell the insistent ambiguity and openness of linguistic and cultural signification" (Butler 1990:40) . For Butler, structuralist theory recognizes the arbitrariness of the sign, but it nevertheless focuses more on the completeness of the linguistic system at the expense of the moment of difference between the signifier and the signified. In contrast, Butler suggests, poststructuralism focuses on the moment of difference. "As a result, the discrepancy between signifier and signified becomes the operative and limitless différance of language, rendering all referentiality into a potentially limitless displacement" (Butler 1990:40) . . . in what way a specific mode of subjugation was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a 'scientific' status." 3 Or, for instance, in these sentences in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: "The object, in short, is to define the regime of powerknowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality in our part of the world. . . . [T] he essential aim will not be to determine whether these discursive productions and these effects of power lead one to formulate the truth about sex, or on the contrary falsehoods designed to conceal that truth, but rather to bring out the 'will to knowledge' that serves as both their support and their instrument." 4 In this essay, I hope to unpack these compound sentences and, in the process, provide a synoptic answer to the question "What is Poststructuralism?" It has always struck me as odd that so many contemporary critical theorists are reluctant to offer a concise answer to that question. The question, after all, is no less simplistic or embarrassing than the question famously posed in 1784 that prompted the seminal essays of Kant and Mendelssohn. It seems appropriate, today, to offer an answer to the question "What is poststructuralism?" with the same degree of clarity and sincerity.
Poststructuralism builds on, but, more importantly, rejects some of the central tenets of structuralism-from whence it gets its name. For this reason, it is crucial, in The second tenet is perhaps the most familiar today, and represents the idea that meaning in language derives from the relationships of difference and similarity between terms, and not from the terms themselves. As Ferdinand de Saussure explained, language is a system of differences, without positive terms; it is a set of relations of difference and similarity, rather than a set of terms that are differentiated. "In the language itself, there are only differences," Saussure emphasized. "Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences, and no positive terms." (Saussure 1989:118 [166] ; see also Pettit 1975:8; Caws 1988:72-73) . This fundamental insight of structural linguistics has had important implications for the social sciences. As applied to symbolic action, it suggests that the meaning of behaviors cannot be deciphered in isolation and do not derive their meaning from themselves alone, but rather from the distinctions and similarities between different meanings. As Lévi-Strauss explains, "The error of traditional anthropology, like that of traditional linguistics, was to consider the terms, and not the relations between the terms." (1967a:45).
This is the heart of linguistic structuralism, and it may be worth stopping here for a moment to emphasize the point: in order to understand someone speaking a common language, meaning is derived from the relations between terms and not from the objects or the words themselves. The meaning of the "desk table" that you are leaning on taking reading this essay does not derive from the object you are leaning on only or from the concept alone, but from the relations of difference between that object/concept and other object/concepts that we call dinner tables, bar tables, coffee tables, book shelves, and even graphic tables in books. It is in the relations of difference between these terms and between these objects that meaning is formed. I will come back to this central point repeatedly.
The third tenet of structuralism is the idea that the relations of difference and similarity form a structure or system. As Saussure explained, "A language is a system in which all the elements fit together, and in which the value of any one element depends on the simultaneous coexistence of all the others" (1989: 113 [159] ; see also Caws 1988:72) .
One consequence is that, as the structure becomes more apparent, patterns become evident. As Duncan Kennedy suggests, "the power of structuralist methodology is that it
shows that what at first appears to be an infinitely various, essentially contextual mass of utterances (parole) is in fact less internally various and less contextual than that appearance" (Kennedy 1994:343) .
The first tenet is that these relations of difference and the overall structure of relations are second nature. They operate at the level of the unconscious. They are taken for granted. This tenet is much less controversial than the others and it too has its source in Saussure, who suggested that language is not produced intentionally and consciously, but is the work of unconscious mechanisms. As Saussure explained, "people use their language without conscious reflexion, being largely unaware of the laws which govern it" The fourth basic tenet of structuralism is that structural analysis can help discover general laws with universal character-this is the most controversial tenet and what really gives birth, later, to the poststructuralist break and the rejection of such notions of general laws. But let me not anticipate too much. In Lévi-Strauss's structuralism especially, there is a strong tendency toward both binarism and universalism. Lévi-Strauss's tendency toward binarism is reflected well, for instance, in the following passage from The Savage
Mind:
All the levels of classification in fact have a common characteristic: whichever, in the society under consideration, is put first it must authorize-or even imply-possible recourse to other levels, formally analogous to the favoured one and differing from it only in their relative position within a whole system of reference which operates by means of a pair of contrasts: between general and particular on the one hand, and nature and culture on the other. think, the way we analyze, the way we categorize and relate concepts.
It's worth noting here that many later structuralists-and scholars heavily influenced by structuralism-minimize or attenuate this fourth tenet, suggesting that Levi-Strauss himself was not so naïve as to believe that these structures were in fact complete and binary and predictive. 5 As you'll see, this is the primary source of poststructuralist tension-but the seeds of that tension began early and reside right here in the conflict over this fourth tenet. I think these later structuralists are simply wrong and that Lévi-Strauss himself was deeply committed, as a social scientist, to the enterprise of deriving general, universal, and preferably binary laws. The road will then be open for a comparative structural analysis of customs, institutions and accepted patterns of behavior. We shall be in a position to understand basic similarities between forms of social life, such as language, art, law, and religion, that on the surface seem to differ greatly. At the same time, we shall have the hope of overcoming the opposition between the collective nature of culture and its manifestations in the individual, since the so-called "collective consciousness" would, in the final analysis, be no more than the expression, on the level of individual thought and behavior, of certain time and space modalities of the universal laws which make up the unconscious activity of the mind. The turn to structuralism was intended to give us a better purchaseCa more scientific perspectiveCon human behavior. The goal was to improve our ability to understand action and predict behavior. The purpose was to decipher necessary patterns. It is somewhat easy today not to see how radical structuralism was at the time.
The previous discussion may seem obvious, natural or intuitive to many today-in part because, as with most important ideas, we have absorbed today bits and pieces of structuralism. We have all become, today, a bit structuralist. But you have to understand, these four tenets were radical at the time and represented a stark departure from the dominating philosophical approach in Paris in the early 1960s, namely phenomenological existentialism which had been made popular by Jean-Paul Sartre's plays and novels and held a firm grip on the public imagination (at least on the Continent). In order to fully appreciate the radical nature of structuralism, it is useful here to contrast Lévi-Strauss' framework to Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy.
There is a fascinating passage in a little known interview of Sartre by Pierre
Verstraeten in the Revue d'Esthétique in 1965 that reveals the stark difference between
Sartre and Lévi-Strauss. In the interview, Sartre is asked whether he draws a distinction between signification and the signifiedCcentral terms in Saussurian structural linguistics that are intended to capture the distinction between concept and object. More specifically, Sartre is asked: "Do you draw a distinction between signification and the signified?" 6 Sartre responds:
Yes, for me the signified is the object. I define my own language, which may not necessarily be the same as linguists: this "chair," it is the object, thus it is the signified; then, there is signification, it is the logical set that will be constituted by words, the signification of a phrase. If I say "This table is in front of the window," I am aiming at a signified that is the table by significations that are the set of phrases that are constituted, and I consider me, myself, as the signifier. The signification, that is the noema, the correlate of the set of vocal elements proffered. (Sartre 1965 :311, emphasis added) 7 Sartre's response is stunning. By identifying with "the signifier," Sartre boldly turns the focus of meaning back on the individual subject. The individual subject is the one who gives meaning. There is no mediation through what structural linguists would traditionally call the signifier-the socially constructed relations of concepts. For Sartre, 6 . « Faites-vous une distinction entre signification et signifié? » 7. « Oui, pour moi le signifié c'est l'objet. Je définis mon langage qui n'est pas nécessairement celui des linguistes: cette « chaise », c'est l'objet, donc c'est le signifié; ensuite, il y a la signification, c'est l'ensemble logique qui sera constitué par des mots, la signification d'une phrase. Si je dis « Cette table est devant la fenêtre », je vise un signifié qui est la table par des significations qui sont l'ensemble des phrases qui sont constituées, et je me considère moi-même comme le signifiant. La signification, c'est le noème, le corrélat de l'ensemble des éléments vocaux proférés. » (Emphasis added). the actor imposes meaning by himself. The individual actor is the agent who gives meaning-who decides, who deliberates, who chooses, who acts.
In sharp contrast to structuralism, which begins from the intersubjectivity of shared meaning, the point of departure for existentialism is the individual meaning giver-the agent alone. This traces, at least for Sartre, to the very heart of our being as humans. According to Sartre, what defines our being-as humans-is precisely our ability to negate our situation, to create nothingness in the heart of our being through our own acts and interpretations. In contrast to inanimate objects, human subjects have the ability to negate, to reject, or to alter their own condition by imposing meaning onto the world (Sartre 1943:56) . It is in this sense, Sartre declares in L'Être et le néant, that "Man is the being through which nothingness comes to the world" (1943:59) . It is in the act of negation that possibilities present themselves. It is through the process of negation that the subject can seek alternatives to his present condition. The act of negation-of rejecting our condition-occurs precisely when the individual acts intentionally in pursuit of his project, and it is what renders the individual truly free. For Sartre, freedom is precisely the ability to negate a present condition. "Freedom is the human being placing his past off-sides, and secreting his own nothingness" (1943:64) . This is, for Sartre, a moment of great anxiety-an anxiety that makes us conscious of our freedom. "It is through anxiety," Sartre wrote, "that man becomes conscious of his freedom" (1943:64).
The individual subject as meaning giver is at the heart of Sartre's project: situations do not give meaning to agents, agents give meaning to situations. And central to this process of meaning giving, is the act of negation. As Sartre explained:
It is important to invert general opinion and recognize that it is not the difficulty of a situation or the suffering that it imposes that are the reasons that we conceive of another state of being where everyone would be better off; on the contrary, it is on the day that we can conceive of that other state of being that a new light falls on our troubles and on our suffering and that we decide that they are insufferable. (Sartre 1943:489) The focus on subjectivity and intentionality characterizes Sartre's phenomenological gaze. "One has to start from subjectivity," Sartre emphasized in his lecture in 1945, L'existentialisme est un humanisme (1958:17):
Our point of departure is in effect the subjectivity of the individual, and this for strictly philosophical reasons. Not because we are bourgeois, but because we want a doctrine based on truth, and not on a set of pretty theories full of hope but without real foundation. There can be no other truth, to start with, than this: I think therefore I am. It is here that we find the absolute truth of conscience finding itself. . . . In other words, for there to be any truth, there has to be absolute truth; and this one is simple, easy to attain, accessible to all. It consists in seizing oneself without intermediary. (1958:64-65) From this highly subjective perspective, the individual invents himself through his actions. Simply put, he is nothing more than the actions he takes. He defines his meaning and he defines himself through the act of giving meaning-acting on those meanings. (Harcourt 2006: 127-128) . Using these columns, the structure of the play can be represented in a simple schema of rows and columns. As Lévi-Strauss explains, "Were we to tell the myth, we would disregard the columns and read the rows from left to right and from top to bottom. But if we want to understand the myth, then we will have to disregard one half of the diachronic dimension (top to bottom) and read from left to right, column after column, each one being considered as a unit" (Lévi-Strauss 1967d:211).
To the structuralist, then, the phenomenological focus on the individual as meaning giver, is simply incapable of generating useful findings-scientific findings.
Lévi-Strauss emphasized this in La Pensée sauvage, where he wrote:
He who begins by steeping himself in the allegedly self-evident truths of introspection never emerges from them. Knowledge of men sometimes seems easier to those who allow themselves to be caught up in the snare of personal identity. But they thus shut the door on knowledge of man. . . Sartre in fact becomes the prisoner of his Cogito: Descartes made it possible to attain universality, but conditionally on remaining psychological and individual; by sociologizing the Cogito, Sartre merely exchanges one prison for another. Each subject's group and period now take the place of timeless consciousness. I have never found Hugo a sympathetic character, and I have never thought he was in the right as against Hoederer. But I was trying to present in him the torments of a certain type of youth which, though it is emotionally inclined to a protest of a kind which is very specifically communist, does not go as far as joining the party because of its humanist educational background. I did not want to say whether they were right or wrong; if I had, my play would have been propagandist. I simply tried to describe them. But Hoederer's is the only attitude I think sound. (Sartre 1976:210) Sartre tried to give this malentendu a positive spin. It reflected, he suggested, the dogmatism of StalinismC"that is to say," in his words, "the fact that a critical 'fellowtraveler' was not tolerated at that time" (Sartre 1976 The semiological theorem of the exteriority of the signifier has thus a political corollary. The self-styled 'political ideologies' of our societies are, very precisely, myths, and their symbolic efficacy (the trust of the faithful, the adherence of the masses) is no guarantee of their correspondence with the reality which they claim to describe. Lévi-Strauss is explicit on this point. "Nothing resembles mythological thought more than political ideology." A myth is the account of a founding event, of a privileged episode belonging at once to a certain time (its origin) and to all time (since festivals are given over to repeating it). (Descombes 1980 
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But structuralism failed to deliver on its promise of scientific predictability. The third mode of knowledge, Bourdieu attributed to himself: it is a theory of practice, and it represents a break-though I would suggest, a synthesis as well-from both existential and structuralist modes of knowledge. Its aim is "to make possible a science of the dialectical relations between the objective structures to which the objectivist mode of knowledge gives us access and the structured dispositions within which those structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them" (1977:3). It is a mode of knowledge that treats actors as ensconced within structuresCsemiotic and materialCthat are internalized and taken for granted, and who navigate these structures strategically. Actors understand the rules of the game, and play by, manipulate, and strategize the rules often in a second-hand way. It incorporates both the Lévi-Straussian moment of unconscious structures and the Sartrian moment of subjectivity in a theory of practice that is intended to let us better understand and predict actions.
For Bourdieu, the tension between structuralism and existentialism crystallized the central problem in contemporary thought-namely, the lack of a theory of human agency. The thrust of Bourdieu's intervention was to emphasize how Sartre, but also Lévi-Strauss, circumvented this main problemCof how practice relates to the explanatory structures that we are able to discern in our scientific inquiry.
Bourdieu's work is fascinating and helps understand how structuralism can translate into an active theory. But our focus today is on "poststructuralism," and Bourdieu was no poststructuralist. Post-structuralist, perhaps, in the sense that he developed one post-structuralist approach that built on structuralism; however, not "poststructuralist" in the sense in which the term has meaning today. The groundwork, though, is now posed to turn to "poststructuralism."
Poststructuralism
In relation to the four basic tenets of structuralism discussed earlier, poststructuralism builds on the first three tenets, but rejects the fourthCthe idea that we could discover general laws. It builds on the notion that meanings are derived from relations of difference, that these are largely subconscious, and that they form a structure.
But it emphasizes the gaps and ambiguities in the structure of meanings. Lévi-Strauss had said that "starting from ethnographic experience, I have always aimed at drawing up an inventory of mental patterns, to reduce apparently arbitrary data to some kind of order, and to attain a level at which a kind of necessity becomes apparent, underlying the Poststructuralism resists, then, the fourth tenet: structures of meanings are not universal, and do not reflect ontological truths about humans or society. Poststructuralists focus on those gaps and ambiguities in the system of meaning and find meaning there.
The inquiry is, in essence, flipped on its head: the idea is not to find regularity, but
instead to probe what the "discovered regularity" could possibly mean. What does it mean that we find patterns and closed systems of meaning? How is it that we come to believe that the semiotic structure is complete? This is the key move of poststructuralism:
How is it that we come to believe the meaning we impose in order to hide the gaps and ambiguities?
The Foucault's perspective, in effect, asks a different set of questions than the structuralists, but derived from the structuralist framework. Foucault is interested in the history of knowledge and rationality, the history of the subject. How is it possible that any of these discourses-existentialism, structuralism or practice theory-could be received as correct, useful, intelligible? How does the process of making a discourse 'true' shape the way we, as subjects, judge, think, categorize, desire the other? How is it that we turn ourselves into objects of study? This is not to suggest, of course, that discourses do not become 'true.' They certainly have. They are true to many of us. But that is not the issue, for Foucault. The real question is, how is it that they have come to be seen as true at this particular time?
Post-structuralism and Foucault's project thus bear a strained relationship to structuralism-building on parts, but rejecting others. Foucault himself was adamant that he was not structuralist. "I have never been structuralist," Foucault exclaimed in interview (Foucault 1983b:435) . In the English preface to The Order of Things, he explained: "In France, certain half-witted 'commentators' persist in labelling me a 'structuralist'. I have been unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used none of the methods, concepts, or key terms that characterize structural analysis. I should be grateful if a more serious public would free me from a connection that certainly does me honour, but that I have not deserved" (Foucault 1970:xiv I should like to know whether the subjects responsible for scientific discourse are not determined in their situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by conditions that dominate and even overwhelm them. In short, I tried to explore scientific discourse not from the point of view of the individuals who are speaking, nor from the point of view of the formal structures of what they are saying, but from the point of view of the rules that come into play in the very existence of such discourse: what conditions did Linnaeus (or Petty, or Arnauld) have to fulfill, not to make his discourse coherent and true in general, but to give it, at the time when it was written and accepted, value and practical application as scientific discourseCor, more exactly, as naturalist, economic, or grammatical discourse? (Foucault 1970:xiv) .
To be sure, in The Order of Things, the specific conditions of different periods take on a structuralist flavor. This is reflected in his project of unearthing what he calls the "code of knowledge" (1970:ix) or "system" (1970:x) of given periodsCof revealing what he calls "a positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature" (1970:xi). These are the unconscious, but shared rules that scientists from different disciplines converge on during a period. These common rules are a code, a language, an episteme. "It is these rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological"
(1970:xi). And, in a highly self-reflexive move, Foucault recognized that his link to subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicityCwhich, in short, leads to a transcendental consciousness" (Foucault 1970:xiv) .
structuralism was in part brought about by his having to place his own discourse within contemporary debate. Just as Linnaeus had to fulfill specific conditions to make his thought intelligible, Foucault also had to deploy certain current discursive practices to make his research value. "It would hardly behoove me, of all people, to claim that my discourse is independent of conditions and rules of which I am very largely unaware, and which determine other work that is being done today" (Foucault 1970:xiv) . In other words, he recognized that his writings too were shaped and framed in part by the episteme of his epoch, which is in large part a structuralist idea. He was, in this sense, caught in a structuralist framework.
But, his inquiry was different. His focus was not on the structures in the discourses, but rather on how scientists had to shape their discourse in any particular period to make it intelligible. And second, he was resisting the cohesiveness of the structuralist framework. He focuses on the many "gaps" in the story that define the work, and help make it an "open site" (1970:xii). His "main concern" was with the many changes that reorganize, alter, transform the sciences and the codes of knowledge As noted earlier, in her book Gender Trouble, Judith Butler locates poststructuralism in the work of Jacques Derrida (Butler 1990 :158 n.6). If, as I suggest, her definition is right, then why the different location? "Why not in Derrida?" you may ask.
Why do I classify Derrida as a deconstructionist and distinguish deconstruction from poststructuralism? 12 The primary reason, I would argue, is that deconstruction never embraces the moment of developing an explanation-a complex social theoretic, historical, and genealogical explanation-for how we come to believe what we do believe. Foucault does-for instance, when he meticulously explains how we came to 12 For some of the best discussions of deconstruction, Deconstruction, in effect, never overcomes the radical moment of ambiguating meaning, which distinguishes it significantly from poststructuralist work.
One can see this well in a text like Force de loi, the first part of which is a keynote lecture that Jacques Derrida delivered in October 1989 at a conference titled "Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice" in New York City. The text is fascinating and plays on the structural relations between law and justice, but it does not move significantly past the slippage once it has identified the ethical choice. Relying on a "pensée" of Pascal, Derrida excavates in Force de loi the basis of a modern critique of liberal legalism. The "pensée" in question concerns the relationship between justice, law, and might (la force), and is indeed provocative: "It is important then to bring together justice and might; and to that end, to make sure that that which is just be strong, and that which is strong be just" (Derrida 1994:28) . This exposes, for Derrida, the mystical foundation of the authority of law, and enables a modern critique of liberal legalist ideology (32) . The foundation of law, Derrida suggests, is precisely the force required to first create, inaugurate, or found the law itself. This, Derrida suggests, requires "un appel à la croyance" (a leap of faith) and thus represents "un coup de force" (32) (33) ; and it exposes deconstructive possibilities. It makes possible, according to Derrida, the very possibility of deconstruction (35) , which is precisely what leads him, paradoxically, to assert that "La deconstruction est la justice" (35) . What he means by that is that it is precisely the auto-authorization of law-the moment of the appeal to faith-in law itself that represents the moment of rupture, of indeterminacy, and of force that makes possible the critique of liberal legalism and that represents the moment of deconstructive practice.
In typical fashion, it represents a Derridean inversion of the very title of the conference, "Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice." It is justice-because it is selfauthorizing-that creates the possibility of critique and thus, the possibility of deconstruction. Notice here, though, and importantly, that Derrida does not take the further step-which I associate with poststructuralism-of offering a social theoretic, historical, or genealogical account of how we come to take that central leap of faith.
Derrida stops with the identification itself.
In the end, then, poststructuralism should be distinguished from deconstruction, and represents the penultimate stage of modernity. It is the stage where we began to focus on the ambiguity in meaning as the central location at the edge of critical reason that helps identify ethical choice. Derridean construction, I would argue, comes after poststructuralism and represents the last stage of modernity: no longer willing to offer thick descriptions of how we come to take our leaps of faith, deconstruction focuses only on the ethical choice itself. What comes after deconstruction? Perhaps the absolute acknowledgment of the limits of critical reason and the refusal to take any leap of faith at all. Perhaps a turn, instead, to randomization. 13 13 I stop here and offer this only as a prolegomenon to further reflection on the role of chance and randomization in a post-modern period. I have made some tentative beginnings along this direction in an essay titled Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment.
